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The Feminist Dilemma Over Unwed
Parents' Custody Rights: The




The feminist community generally, but not unanimously,
favors sex-neutral child custody rights for divorcing parents.
This most common feminist view, which I will call the "main-
stream" feminist view, is that fathers who know that courts will
always prefer mothers have no incentive to share the childrear-
ing responsibilities that women have always borne alone.
"Mainstream" feminists envision a future non-sexist world in
which parents share equally in their children's upbringing, thus
allowing women to participate fully in the world of paid work
from which they have so long been excluded. Although the fu-
ture vision of feminists may coincide, our current viewpoints
may not. To begin this discussion I briefly review the history of
custody rights and current feminist perspectives on the issue.
My focus then turns to unwed mothers' custody rights. I advo-
cate legal recognition of the considerations that actually influ-
ence a pregnant unwed woman's decision whether to abort, to
raise the child herself, or to surrender the child for adoption.
The earliest common law courts always granted custody of
children to the divorced father.' Mothers gained the right sim-
ply to seek custody only in the mid-nineteenth century. But by
the mid-twentieth century the flow of custody rights had swung
in the mother's direction. Case law and statutes had estab-
* Professor, College of Law, Ohio State University; A.B., 1967, Vassar Col-
lege; J.D., 1973, Brooklyn Law Schools LL.M., 1979, Yale Law School. Many
thanks are due to Elliot Fishman for his untiring efforts to assist with the re-
search for this paper.
1. Michael Grossberg, Who Gets the Child? Custody, Guardianship, and
the Rise of a Judicial Patriarchy in Nineteenth Century America, 9 Feminist
Studies 235, 238-39 (1983); Jamil Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern Ameri-
can Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 Nw.
U.L. Rev. 1038, 1052 (1979).
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lished the "tender years presumption." This doctrine gave cus-
todial preference to the mother. One version of the doctrine
gave custody to the mother unless she was found to be unfit.2
Another version of the doctrine gave a presumption to the
mother only as a tiebreaking device, when all other factors
were equal.3 Currently, most states reject any version of the
presumption.4
For differing reasons a few feminists argue for a return to
the "tender years presumption." Some feminists cite evidence
that the mother-child relationship is psychologically more im-
portant than the father-child relationship.S Other feminists
note the convincing evidence that fathers have not assumed
substantial responsibility for childcare burdens. They argue
that in this context the absence of a tender years presumption
allows men to oppress women in two ways. First, since nothing
compels fathers to assume their rightful amount of childcare
responsibility, women bear that burden. Second, even though
fathers fail to share the burdens of parenthood, they still claim
"equal" rights to the benefits, which include "equal" rights to
custody upon divorce.6 Finally, some feminists urge recognition
of the physical and emotional dangers of childbearing.7 These
dangers are especially significant to the issue of custody rights
when the mother either has experienced all the pregnancies
her body can handle or is post-menopausal. In contrast to
many mothers, most fathers will probably have the future abil-
ity to become a parent for many years.
In the divorce context the "mainstream" feminist view,
however, appears to advocate formal sexual neutrality rather
than preference for the mother. One author explains "main-
stream" feminist opposition to the tender years presumption:
2. See, e.g., New York's tender years presumption, repudiated in State ex
rel Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 350 N.Y.S. 2d 285 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1973). New
York law is now sex neutral N.Y. Doam. ReL Law § 240 (McKinney 1983).
3. See, e.g., Alaska's tender years presumption, repudiated in Johnson v.
Johnson, 564 P.2d 71 (Alaska 1977).
4. A most recent survey of custody laws lists 38 states which have rejected
the presumption, four states which retain the tiebreaker version, and eight
states with doubtful or unique laws. Doris Freed & Henry Foster, Divorce in
Fifty States: An Overview as of August 1, 1981, 7 Fam. L Rep. 4049, 4063 (1981).
5. See Ramsay Klafl The Tender Years Doctrine: A Defense, 70 Calif. L.
Rev. 335, 343-46 (1982).
6. Id. at 346-47 (cites two studies of paternal interaction with their chil-
dren, both of which found that fathers typically interacted with their children
less than one minute per day); Rena Uviller, Fathers' Rights and Femini.m
The Maternal Presumption Revisited, 1 Harv. Women's L.J. 107 (1978).
7. Committee for Mother and Child Rights, Position Paper (1983). See in-
fra notes 101.103 and accompanying text.
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The maternal presumption in divorce proceedings is anath-
ema to most feminists. The legal presumption that children
belong with their mothers absent maternal unfitness rein-
forces the enduring stereotype of women as instinctive
child rearers, inherently unsuited for worldly pursuits. Ab-
jured by those who also reject sex-role assignments in fam-
ily life, the maternal presumption presupposes a societal
order of stay-at-home mothers with fathers as sole eco-
nomic providers.8
Even "mainstream" feminists would agree that formal sex-
ual "equality" often operates to the detriment of women.
Judges may prefer the parent with the most money, usually the
father, rather than the parent with the closer relationship to
the child.9 Judges may view a calm, authoritarian father as a
better potential custodian than a mother who appears emotion-
ally shattered by the divorce.' 0 Judges may be reluctant to
award alimony and may view custodial responsibilities as detri-
mental to an ex-housewife's ability to support herself." If the
mother is employed, they may penalize her by a denial of cus-
tody for not being a full-time mother.12 Judges may also be
swayed to grant custody to a father if there is a new wife wait-
ing in the wings to become the children's new mother.' 3 Main-
stream feminists would describe these scenarios simply as
abuses of an otherwise fair system, a system they define as for-
mal sexual equality in the law of child custody upon divorce.
To obliterate these abuses, many mainstream feminists
would argue for a presumption in favor of the "primary care-
taker parent."' 4 Such a presumption, if applied properly, would
operate to favor mothers in most custody cases. Mothers would
benefit not by virtue of biology, but by virtue of their greater
contribution to the child's welfare after birth. If the father ac-
8. Uviller, supra note 6, at 108.
9. Nancy Polikoff, Why are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria
Used in Child Custody Determination, 7 Women's Rts. L. Rep. 235, 237-39
(1982).
10. Cf. Lucy Katz, The Maternal Preference and the Psychological Parent:
Suggestions for Allocating the Burden of Proof in Custody Litigation, 53 Conn.
B.J. 343, 347 (1974).
11. This view may, in fact, covertly underlie judicial preference for the fa-
ther in some cases where the reason given is the father's superior economic po-
sition. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
12. Polikoff, supra note 9, at 239-41.
13. Id. at 241.
14. Id. at 241-43. At least three states currently have judicial precedent
favoring the primary caretaker standarck Pennsylvania (Jordan v. Jordan, 8
Fam. L. Rep. 2596 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982)); Oregon (Van Dyke v. Van Dyke, 48 Or.
App. 965, 618 P.2d 465 (1980)); and West Virginia (Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E. 2d
357 (W. Va. 1981)).
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tually bore the greater childcare load, he would be "rewarded"
by an award of custody.15
Even if the "primary caretaker parent" presumption be-
came widely adopted in divorce custody cases and were ap-
plied properly and fairly, it would not help resolve all custody
disputes between unwed parents. On this subject, the feminist
community appears bitterly split.
Different reactions to three similar scenarios that involve
unwed couples illustrate the various feminist views. In the first
scenario, a woman and man have a sexual relationship.
Neither intends for the relationship to lead to procreation but
the woman accidentally gets pregnant. She decides on abor-
tion, which the man opposes. He offers to pay her maternity
expenses and to accept full responsibility for the child if she
carries the pregnancy to term. She refuses and has an abor-
tion. Virtually the whole feminist community believes that she
has an absolute right to do so. 16
In the second scenario the unwed couple conceive a child
under similar circumstances. Although she had no intention to
have a child, the woman decides to continue the pregnancy and
to raise the child herself. Perhaps she always wanted children
but never found a man she wanted to marry. Perhaps she is
concerned about the "biological clock." Perhaps she knows she
eventually wants children and decides it might as well be now.
Perhaps she opposes abortion on moral grounds. Perhaps she
fears that an abortion may leave her unable to bear further
children. Whatever her reasons for continuing the initially un-
intended pregnancy, the woman does not want to marry the bi-
ological father, to live with him, or to have her life controlled in
15. The purpose of the primary caretaker parent presumption is not to re-
ward a parent for caring for a child. The purpose of the presumption is to serve
the best interests of the child by awarding custody to the parent who has had
the most interaction with the child on a day-to-day basis. That parent is the
person to whom the child is likely to be more psychologically connected, akin
to the "psychological parent" of Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud & Albert Solnit,
Beyond the Best Interests of the Child (1973). Even though rewarding a "duti-
ful" parent is not the goal of the primary caretaker presumption, it has that ef-
fect and may, in fact, encourage men to take on more childcare responsibilities.
Polikoff, supra note 9, at 242.
16. The National Organization for Women and virtually every other feminist
organization supports a woman's right to make the abortion decision without
legal coercion by anyone, including the potential father. See National Organi-
zation for Women Bill of Rights, 1968, in Judith Hole & Ellen Levine, Rebirth of




any way by him. She does not want him to have visitation
rights. She does not intend to ask him for child support.
After the child is born, the father sues for custody; if he
does not get custody, he wants visitation. The feminist commu-
nity does not have a unanimous response to this issue. Some
would deny custody to the father. They would argue that since
the mother had the absolute right to decide to abort and de-
cided to allow her body to be used to bear the child, she should
have priority for custody.17 Many feminists would allow the fa-
ther visitation rights, even if such rights would be an imposi-
tion on the mother's freedom. Their reasoning seems to
assume that the child benefits from the father's visitation and
that this benefit justifies an imposition on the mother.'8
17. See, e.g., Jessica Curtis, Single Mothers by Choice (forthcoming 1985)
(Curtis helped found Single Mothers by Choice, 501 Twelfth St., Brooklyn, N.Y.
12215, a mutual support organization for single mothers and women contem-
plating single motherhood).
18. The visitation issue is rarely discussed, possibly because the custody is-
sue is so much more important. The visitation issue does arise, however, when
the custodial parent, usually the mother, wishes to relocate, and the non-custo-
dial parent objects on the basis that exercise of his visitation rights requires
that the custodial parent stay close to where he lives. At first glance, this argu-
ment seems to have some merit, until one realizes that (1) the custodial parent
cannot require the non-custodial parent to visit, and many non-custodial par-
ents in fact do not exercise their visitation rights fully, and (2) the custodial
parent cannot prohibit the non-custodial parent from relocating to wherever he
wishes. See Brigitte Bodenheimer, Equal Rights, Visitation and the Right to
Move, 1 Fain. Advoc. 19 (1978); Note, Residence Restrictions on Custodial Par-
ents: Implications for the Right to Travel, 12 Rutgers L.J. 341 (1981); D'Onofrio
v. D'Onofrio, 144 N.J. Super. 200, 365 A.2d 27 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), affid, 365
A.2d 716 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
The issue of unwed father visitation could get more complex if the mother
was married to someone else at the conception or birth of the child. Most
states still have a presumption that a child conceived or born in wedlock is the
child of the husband. May the biological father sue to rebut that presumption?
If the husband and wife are still married, a paternity suit might be very disrup-
tive of the marriage. See the Cleveland case discussed infra, note 87.
If the husband and wife are in the process of divorce, the husband may
wish to deny paternity to avoid child support payments. Many states allow the
husband to do so, probably on the theory that he should not have to support a
child who is not his child. See, e.g., N.Y. Dom. ReL Law § 175 (McKinney 1977).
But some states do not allow the wife to compel submission to blood tests to
disprove the husband's paternity, probably on the theory that if the husband
will accept responsibility for the child, that will benefit the state which other-
wise might have to support the child on public assistance. Such a rule would
benefit the taxpayers but not necessarily the mother or the child. See Caton v.
Caton, No. 83-716 (Okla. Ct. App. March 15, 1983), cert. denied, 52 U.S.LW. 3510
(U.S. Jan. 10, 1984) (No. 83-716).
Consider further the constitutionality of a law permitting the mother to as-
sert that her husband is not the father but denying the biological father the
right to assert paternity. See Cunningham v. Golden, No. 83-357 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Feb. 24, 1983), appeal dimissed, 104 S. Ct. 2336 (1984).
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Again in the third scenario, a couple conceive a child
under similar circumstances. The woman decides, probably on
religious grounds, against an abortion. But she wants the best
possible home and parents for the baby. She does not believe
the biological father will be the right kind of parent for the
child. She decides to place the child for adoption. The father
objects and sues for custody. On this issue the feminist com-
munity has two distinct viewpoints.
One view supports the unwed father, saying- "If the
mother doesn't want the child, the father should have priority
over strangers. After all, he is the child's father."19 The other
view supports the unwed mother, saying- "She had all the re-
sponsibilities and by not getting custody herself gains no bene-
fits. She should have all the decisionmaking rights."
20
In Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc. ,21 these
two opposing viewpoints clashed for the first time in a judicial
context. The dispute in the Kirkpatrick case involved a
mother's interest in having the baby adopted and a father's in-
terest in gaining custody. The child's unwed parents were resi-
dents of a small Nebraska town. They began a sexual
relationship when Ms. S. was fourteen years old and Mr. Kirk-
patrick was twenty-two years old.2 2 The couple unintentionally
conceived the child when Ms. S. was fifteen years old.2 3 Even
though the conception of a child between a minor and an adult
was evidence of statutory rape,24 the local authorities did not
indict the father.
Upon learning of her unwanted pregnancy, Ms. S. con-
sulted with her parents and decided to place the child for adop-
tion.25  Having been adopted herself she realized the
advantages of adoption and had great concern for the stigma at-
tached to a child born out of wedlock in a small town. She
went to Texas, to the Christian Homes of Abilene, a home for
19. See Brief for Petitioner at 26-30, Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abi-
lene, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 1760 (1983).
20. See Brief of Nancy S. Erickson, The National Center on Women & Fam-
ily Law, Inc., and the Committee for Mother and Child Rights, as Amicus Cu-
riae On Behalf of Unwed Mothers, Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene,
Inc., 103 S.Ct. 1760 (1983). [hereinafter cited as Unwed Mothers' Amicus Brief].
21. 103 S. Ct. 1760 (1983) (vacated and remanded for determination of an is-
sue of state law- whether under Texas law Kirkpatrick could have and still
may obtain a decree designating him the father of the child).
22. Joint Appendix at 172a, Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc.,
103 S. Ct. 1760 (1983).
23. Joint Appendix at 32a-33a, Kirkpatrick.
24. Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 28-318, 28-319, 28-105 (1979).
25. Joint Appendix at 151a-52a, 173a-75a, 177a-79a, Kirkpatrick.
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unwed mothers. She stayed there until she gave birth to Baby
Girl S. on January 11, 1981.26
Mr. Kirkpatrick's interest in custody of the child varied
throughout the pregnancy.27 He asked Ms. S. to marry him, but
she refused because she felt she was too young.28 He then ini-
tially agreed to the adoption 29 and offered to pay the mother's
maternity expenses while she stayed at the unwed mothers'
home.30 He actually paid only $70 of her expenses, which ex-
ceeded $4,000.31
Following the birth of Baby Girl S. and the initiation of
adoption proceedings by the Christian Homes of Abilene, Mr.
Kirkpatrick petitioned for voluntary legitimation under Texas
law. 32 Texas law provides that an unwed mother may surren-
der a child for adoption shortly after birth without the consent
of a biological father who has not legitimated the child.33
Whether the child has been legitimated or not, fathers are
given notice of adoption proceedings. 34 A biological father who
legitimates the child obtains the right to veto an adoption.35 He
may legitimate the child if the mother consents.36 If she re-
fuses to consent, the court may override her refusal if it finds
that to do so would be in the best interests of the child.3 7 Thus
a successful petition effectively blocks the adoption
proceeding.38
Based on a determination of the child's best interests, the
trial court denied Mr. Kirkpatrick's petition, and pending ap-
peal, placed the child with a foster family.39 Mr. Kirkpatrick ap-
26. Id. at 109a.
27. Id. at 136a-37a, 160a-61a, 163a, 167a, 284a, 288a.
28. Id. at 178a.
29. Id. at 136a-37a.
30. Id. at 224a-25a.
31. Id. at 354a, 194a. Mr. Kirkpatrick began sending $100 per month to the
court for Baby Girl S. only after the filing of the petition for voluntary legitima-
tion and on the advice of his attorney. Id. at 216a-17a.
32. Tex. Fain. Code Ann. § 13.21 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
33. Tex. Fan. Code Ann. §§ 12.01, 12.02, 15.03(b)(7)(C), and 16.03(d)
(Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1984). Cf. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 13.21(b)(1) (Vernon
Supp. 1984).
34. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 15.04(b)(4)(D) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
35. See infra note 38 and Tex. Faro. Code Ann. § 16.03(b) (Vernon Supp.
1984).
36. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 13.21(b)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
37. Id. at § 13.21(c).
38. Legitimation, in effect, gives father and child all the rights and obliga-
tions that would have accrued if the parents had married. Tex. Fain. Code Ann.
§§ 13.09, 13.21 (Vernon Supp. 1984).




pealed to the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, which affirmed the
lower court's decision.40 The child was then placed with an
adoptive family.41 Mr. Kirkpatrick next successfully petitioned
the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.42
After an apparently bitter internal dispute, the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) decided to represent Mr. Kirk-
patrick during his appeal to the Supreme Court.43 Attorneys
representing both the Women's Rights Project and the Chil-
dren's Rights Project of the ACLU were named on the brief.
Because Ms. S. was not a party to the suit, and therefore unrep-
resented except insofar as the views of the adoption agency
happened to coincide with hers, three amici submitted a brief
on behalf of unwed mothers."
Unwed mothers in Kirkpatrick-type situations argue that
agreement of both mother and father should be necessary for a
biological father to obtain custody rights regarding a child.
Such agreement may be expressed by (1) marriage, as long as
the marriage continues in fact, not just in law, at least until
some reasonable time after the child's birth; (2) cohabitation
by the mother and father with the father participating in the
40. In re Baby Girl S, 628 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982), cert. granted sub
nom. Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 784 (1982), va-
cated and remanded, 103 S. Ct. 1760 (1983).
41. The Brief for Respondent stated
Baby Girl S. was placed in the adoptive couple's home in Septem-
ber of 1982 by Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc. Even though there
remained the possibility that Petitioner would seek review of the
Texas Court's decision by This Honorable Court, it was felt, at that
time, that the possibility of such review was remote because of
This Honorable Court's refusal to grant Writ of Certiorari in In the
Interest of T.E.T. in 1980 (603 S.W.2d 793 [Tex.] cert. denied 450 U.S.
1025) and because it was felt that this Court's decision in Caban v.
Mohammed (441 U.S. 380) was factually distinguishable because
the present case involved a newborn child with whom the unwed
father had established no substantial relationship. In light of legal
precedent which was applicable to Baby Girl S., the decision was
made to place the child with the intended adoptive couple because
of the emotional and psychological ties which Baby Girl S. was de-
veloping daily with her foster family. It was felt that if Baby Girl S.
continued to be raised by her foster family, a later disruption of
that relationship would not be in her best interest. Even though
she remains unadopted, she is establishing a growing relationship
with the couple who desires to adopt her.
Brief for Respondent at 3 n.1, Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc.,
103 S. Ct. 1760 (1983).
42. Kirkpatrick v. Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc., 103 S. Ct. 784 (1982).
43. Telephone interviews with ACLU members (Sept.-Nov. 1982).
44. Unwed Mothers' Amicus Brief, supra note 20. As author of the brief, I
was severely criticized by some feminists who alleged that the brief was anti-
feminist and declined to lend their support.
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child's care; or (3) agreement between the parties to share pa-
rental rights, even if not married or cohabiting.
For a man, by virtue of an accidental pregnancy, to get pa-
rental rights over the objection of the pregnant woman in effect
means that a woman who accidentally gets pregnant is deemed
married to the source of the sperm for purposes of decisions re-
garding the child. Under such a rule, the woman's only alterna-
tive would be to have an abortion, an alternative possibly
contrary to her beliefs, moral principles, or health concerns.
Our desires, as feminists, to see men assume the parental
duties that in the past they have abandoned to women should
not prevent us from recognizing that a legal rule granting an
unwed father exactly the same rights as an unwed mother
could lead to extreme oppression of women.
Our concern, as feminists, that each woman be free to de-
cide, on the basis of her own views rather than the views of the
state, whether or not to bear a child, should also not blind us to
the fact that for many women abortion is not an alternative.
The law must protect these women too. A legal rule should not
be supported if it would force a woman to violate her religious
or moral views just because bearing the child would result in
the father's obtaining rights concerning that child.45
Men should be encouraged to take on the parental roles
that women have been forced to shoulder alone. Men's paren-
tal rights and responsibilities, however, should not be gained at
the expense of women's oppression. A man who wants paren-
tal rights has many ways to accomplish that goal. He can get
married, he can find a woman who wants to live with him and
raise children with him, he can adopt a child, or he can find a
woman who wishes to share the care of a child with him
45. See Unwed Father v. Unwed Mother, 179 Ind. App. 237, 379 N.E.2d 467
(1978). The mother decided not to have an abortion, relying on an oral agree-
ment of the father that he would consent to adoption by others. Thereafter, in
the seventh month of pregnancy, he refused to give his consent to adoption. Id.
at 239, 379 N.E.2d. at 469. The mother fled to another state, where she gave birth
and placed the child for adoption. Id. at 241-42, 379 N.E.2d at 470. The father
brought a paternity action against the mother. The trial court held that he was
estopped from withholding his consent. Id. at 241, 379 N.E.2d at 470. The ap-
peals court held he was not estopped and remanded to the trial court for a de-
termination of the custody issue, instructing the trial court to consider the best
interests of the child, including the fact that the child had been with the adop-
tive family for two years. Id. at 244-45, 379 N.E.2d at 471-72. The appeals court
also hinted that it would be difficult to enforce an order giving custody to the
father, since the child's whereabouts were unknown! On remand, the father's
family circumstances had changed and he decided not to pursue the matter fur-
ther. Telephone interview with Patrick E. Donoghue, the unwed father's attor-
ney (April 25, 1984).
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whether or not they are married or living together. A man
should not be permitted to use a woman's body to obtain a
child for himself over her objections.
The following is an abstract of the Kirkpatrick amicus
brief on behalf of unwed mothers. Because the United States
Supreme Court remanded the Kirkpatrick case for further pro-
ceedings dealing with issues of Texas law, the debate about the
rights of unwed mothers is very much alive. The feminist
reader should decide what position is most consistent with
feminist principles.
I. Substantive Due Process
A. Unwed Fathers' Substantive Due Process Rights
Regarding an At-Birth Adoption
The right to privacy includes the right to decide, without
undue governmental interference, "whether to bear or beget a
child."46 In this case, the state has not interfered with Mr.
Kirkpatrick's decision to beget a child because Mr. Kirkpatrick
never decided to be a parent. This child was accidentally con-
ceived against the wishes of the unwed individuals. Mr. Kirk-
patrick had no expectation of enjoying parental rights. His only
expectation was enjoyment of a sexual relationship. 47 Thus,
the Texas statutes do not interfere with any constitutionally
protected decision to beget a child.
The right to privacy also encompasses "freedom of per-
sonal choice in matters of family life."4 The Court has indi-
cated in many cases that the interest of natural parents in the
care, custody, and management of their child is a fundamental
liberty interest. Mr. Kirkpatrick argued that this liberty inter-
est applies to all "natural parents" by virtue of their biological
relationship to the child.
Even if that is so, the Court has never declared that right
to be absolute. The state may impinge on a fundamental right
if there is a compelling state interest and no less burdensome
46. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
47. Ms. S. originally had the same expectation. Pregnancy, however, altered
that expectation. Thereafter, she had to take on parental duties unless she de-
cided to abort. Along with those parental duties, she would get parental rights.
48. Santosky v. Kramer, 445 U.S. 745, 753 (1982), citing Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816,
845 (1977); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977); Cleveland
Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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alternative. 49 These compelling interests and the lack of less
burdensome alternatives are delineated below.
Mr. Kirkpatrick took his argument based on being a natu-
ral parent one step further. He quoted the following language
from Smith v. Organization of Foster Families50 and argued
that the due process clause would be violated "[i] f a State were
to attempt the breakup of a normal family, over the objection of
the parents and their children, without some showing of unfit-
ness and for the sole reason that to do so was thought to be in
the child's best interest."5 1
Mr. Kirkpatrick erroneously claimed that this language ap-
plies to the facts of his case. The Supreme Court has applied
that language in Quilloin v. Walcott.52 As the Supreme Court
held that the language did not apply to the facts in Quilloin,53 it
similarly does not apply to the facts in this case.
Here the natural family is mother and child. The unwed
biological parents did not agree to marry and, therefore, if the
mother kept the child, Mr. Kirkpatrick would never become
part of the child's family. He has a biological connection to the
child that may deserve recognition. If a court permitted visita-
tion Mr. Kirkpatrick might develop a relationship with the
child, but he would never become part of the child's family as
one who lives or has lived with the family on a day-to-day ba-
sis. It is that definition of family that the Supreme Court had
in mind in Quilloin54 or in an earlier unwed father case, Stan-
ley v. Illinois.55 Peter Stanley, for example, lived with his chil-
dren and their mother for many years as a family.56
Mr. Kirkpatrick claimed that he wanted the opportunity to
establish a family. However, the state is under no obligation to
create a family that the biological parents have not created for
themselves. Mr. Kirkpatrick and Ms. S. were not married, and
unlike Joan and Peter Stanley, never lived together as a de
facto family unit.
49. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
50. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
51. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978), quoting Smith v. Organiza-
tion of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring).
52. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
53. Id at 255.
54. Id. at 256.
55. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
56. Id at 646.
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B. The Texas Laws Serve Compelling State Interests
The Texas statutory scheme permits the mother to place
the child for adoption over the objection of the biological father
unless a court finds legitimation by the father to be in the
child's best interests. 57 This statutory scheme serves at least
four compelling state interests.
First, the state has a compelling interest in promoting the
best interests of the child. The Texas statutes ensure an un-
married, pregnant woman that if she carries the pregnancy to
term she will have full control over decisions concerning the
child unless such decisions are not in the child's best interests.
As the Texas Court of Civil Appeals stated in this case:
(TJhe State has a legitimate interest in protecting the chil-
dren who are born as a result of pre-marital sexual activity.
The mother, by virtue of her pregnancy, is automatically re-
sponsible for the child. She has the physical burdens and
responsibilities of the pregnancy. She can choose to abort
the child or she may carry it full term. The state has a sub-
stantial interest in encouraging the unwed mother to prop-
erly care for the child by assuring her that her wishes as to
the disposition of the child will not, absent her consent or a
finding of the child's best interest, be subject to the abso-
lute veto of the biological father.58
No study has ever documented the effects a paternal adop-
tion veto has on the unwed mother. Statutes of several states
give the right to veto an adoption to those unwed fathers who
have either established their biological paternity or whose pa-
ternity is undisputed. Many states enacted such statutes in re-
action to Stanley v. Illinois,59 but with only ten years elapsing
since the Stanley decision no statistics exist on the effects of
paternal vetoes. Ms. S. testified that if a paternal adoption veto
existed she would reconsider her surrender of the child 6o be-
cause the child would be better off with her than with Mr.
Kirkpatrick.61
Other unwed mothers have voiced their concerns regard-
ing what effect such a veto had or would have had on their deci-
sionmaking.62 D.HL writes from a state that requires the
57. See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
58. In re Baby Girl S., 628 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982).
59. 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (statute held unconstitutional that declared children
of unmarried fathers dependents of the state upon the death of the mother
without any hearing on the parental fitness of the father).
60. Joint Appendix at 186a, Kirkpatrick.
61. IC.
62. For the brief abstracted here, I solicited letters from actual unwed




I was married to the father of my first child, but he left us a
few months after she was born. At the time of our divorce
he was ordered by the judge to pay $100.00 a month in child
support. To this date, I have received $60.00 total for the
four years .... He has also refused to relinquish his paren-
tal right ....
I do not have at the present time a home, a car, or a
job. Therefore, I am unable to provide even the basics of
life. Motherhood has been a constant struggle for me. I do
not want to bring another child into this type of "hand to
mouth" existence. If the father will not give his consent, I
will be forced to keep this child despite my feelings that it
would be in the child's best interest to be adopted.
In my opinion, for our situation, adoption would be
the "ultimate love." I think I deserve the opportunity to
make this decision of love for my child.6 3
S.S. states:
Should the father have contested my decision to place the
baby for adoption, and should he have had the legal right to
do so, I believe my ultimate decision could have been dras-
tically different. As little as he was involved in the preg-
nancy, I believe I can question what his commitment as a
father would have been. Although it's hard to predict how
I'd have reacted if he had threatened the adoption, I believe
I would have fought for custody myself to raise the baby.
The possibilities of that father's right raises fear in me
now. It concerns me so, because, in my case, I was not
ready then to be a mother, much less a single mother. I
might later have resented my child, who would certainly
not have been at fault, for causing me to drop out of college,
etc. And, most importantly, my child might not have been
raised in a secure family environment of acceptance and
love that every child needs and deserves. 64
As these letters illustrate, the decision to permit adoption is
often a mature65 decision and the one most conducive to the
important to them to have the adoption alternative available and what effect it
would have had on their decision-making processes if the father's consent had
been necessary for adoption. Because I assured anonymity to these unwed
mothers, initials (not the real initials) are used.
63. Unwed Mothers' Amicus Brief, supra note 20, at 23-24.
64. Id. at 24-25.
65. Several studies have shown that unwed mothers who choose adoption
rank as relatively mature on scales of psychological adjustment. See, e.g., Rob-
ert Blum & Michael Resnick, Adolescent Sexual Decision-Making: Contracep-
tion, Pregnancy, Abortion, Motherhood, 11:10 Pediatric Annals 797 (1982);
Lucille Grow, Today's Unmarried Mothers: The Choices Have Changed, 58
Child Welfare 363 (1979). Birth mothers who choose adoption cannot be stereo-
typed as selfish and immature individuals who want to rid themselves quickly
of undesired responsibilities by handing over their children to others. Rather,
it appears that in most cases they agonize over the decision and try to decide in
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best interests of the child.
Allowing the pregnant woman to make the choice she be-
lieves is in the child's best interests also serves the child's in-
terests by contributing to the woman's peace of mind during
her pregnancy. Medical research documents that stress suf-
fered by a pregnant woman may have serious detrimental ef-
fects on the fetus. 6
The state has a second compelling state interest, the inter-
est in preserving the woman's fundamental right to choose
whether or not to bear a child.67 The Court stated in Roe v.
Wade that the right of privacy "is broad enough to encompass
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her preg-
nancy."68 If the woman has this decision-making right, then
the state must have the power to preserve the purity of her de-
cision-making process. The state must have the power to pre-
vent her from being coerced in one direction or the other,
especially for the private interests of one individual.
The state may assert an interest to assure that a pregnant
woman is not pressured into having an abortion out of fear of
losing the child to the potential father or fear that her adoption
plans for the child will be thwarted by him. S.J., residing in an
unwed mothers' home in Texas, wrote:
[A] lthough the choice would have been extremely difficult,
I would have had to consider abortion. I don't think I could
go through a full-term pregnancy on my own, knowing I
never could provide [via adoption] the kind of life I want
for [the child].69
Not even a pregnant woman's husband may demand that a fe-
tus be either aborted or carried to term over the objection of
the pregnant woman herself.70 Surely then an unwed potential
father must also lack any such right.
In making the decision whether or not to abort, the preg-
nant woman needs to know that if she foregoes the constitu-
tionally-protected right to abort, the state will enforce her plans
the child's best interests. The state has a compelling interest in encouraging
them to do so.
66. See, e.g., Richard Gorsuch & Martha Key, Abnormalities of Pregnancy as
a Function of Anxiety and Life Stress, 36 Psychosom. Med. 352 (1974); Thomas
Picone et aL, Pregnancy Outcome in North American Women II: Effects of Diet,
Cigarette Smoking, Stress, and Weight Gain on Placentas, and on Neonatal
Physical and Behavioral Characteristics, 36 Am. J. Clin. Nutr. 1214 (1982).
67. Baby Girl S., 628 S.W.2d at 264.
68. 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
69. Unwed Mothers' Amicus Brief, supra note 20, at 28.
70. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
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for the child's future unless they are not in the best interests of
the child. That is precisely what the Texas law does.
The third compelling state interest is the interest in safe-
guarding the unwed mother's fundamental right to anonymity
and her right not to have a relationship with the child if she de-
cides to give it up for adoption. In Whalen v. Roe, the Court
stated:
The cases sometimes characterized as protecting 'privacy'
have in fact involved at least two different kinds of inter-
ests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters, and another is the interest in indepen-
dence in making certain kinds of important decisions.
71
For brevity, we will respectively call these the "non-disclosure"
interest and the "liberty" interest.
At least two courts have found that a birth mother's right
to anonymity stems from the liberty interest. In Margaret S. v.
Edwards,72 the court identified the right of privacy of the birth
mother who has given up a child for adoption as a fundamental
liberty interest, citing Massey v. Parker.73 The liberty interest
included this right because if a woman has a right to choose to
abort, her decision to bear the child and give it up for adoption
should be given the same level of protection. Further, the
choice to place the child for adoption, a choice no one except a
parent may make, is an exercise of the parental right to control
the care, custody, and upbringing of the child.74 In a marital
setting, or in a setting such as in Stanley v. Illinois,75 or Caban
v. Mohammed,76 where the unwed parents have lived together
and raised their children together, both parents have that cus-
todial right. In other contexts the unwed mother alone has that
custodial right.77 She is not only the "primary caretaker par-
71. 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977).
72. 488 F. Supp. 181, 189 n.16 (E.D. La. 1980) (dictum).
73. 362 So. 2d 1195, 1199 (La. Ct. App. 1978), writ granted, 363 So. 2d 1385
(La. 1978) (Schott, J., dissenting).
74. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925), and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
75. 405 U.S. 645, 646 (1972).
76. 441 U.S. 380, 382-83 (1979).
77. See Tex. Farn. Code Ann. § 12.01, 12.04, 15.03, 16.03(d) (Vernon 1975 &
Supp. 1984). A similar custodial right is the right to name the child. Tradition-
ally, unwed mothers have the exclusive right to name their children based on
having the care, custody, and control of the children as legal parents. This is
still the law in most jurisdictions, and custodial mothers of marital children are
now seeking the same right. See In re Marriage of Schiffrnan, 28 CaL 3d 640, 169
Cal. Rptr. 918, 620 P.2d 579 (1980) (Mosk, J., concurring). Statutory provisions
giving unwed fathers superior naming rights to mothers have been invalidated
as unconstitutional. Roe v. Conn., 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Jones v.
McDowell, 53 N.C. App. 434, 281 S.E.2d 192 (1981).
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ent,"78 she is the only caretaker parent.
Other courts have found the non-disclosure interest to be
the source of the birth parent's anonymity right. The Supreme
Court first discussed the non-disclosure privacy interest in
Whalen v. Roe.79 The Court reaffirmed its existence in Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services.80 In Nixon, the Court
found that the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of per-
sonal matters is an element of the right of privacy. 81 The Sec-
ond Circuit found such a non-disclosure privacy interest in
Alma Society v. Mellon,8 2 in which it upheld the validity of a
New York statute requiring the sealing of adoption records.
Even if the right of non-disclosure in the adoption context
were not a fundamental right, a state would have a compelling
interest in protecting that right if it chose to do so. In Catholic
Charities of the Archdiocese of Dubuque v. Zalesky,83 the Iowa
Supreme Court recognized just such a state interest in protect-
ing the confidentiality of adoption proceedings and the privacy
of unwed mothers.84
Letters from several birth mothers indicate the impor-
tance of the confidentiality that adoption affords. R.T. writes:
The reason why it is important to have the alternative of
adoption available to me is because at a young age I will
need time to live my life the right way and not the wrong
way... [Clonfidentiality is important to me because I re-
ally think this [pregnancy] is a mistake and not something
I want everyone knowing because I have a life to live and
need all the time to get over this and I don't want all my
friends to know .... 85
Indeed, confidentiality is often a most critical factor for a preg-
nant woman deciding whether to proceed with an adoption
78. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362-64 (W. Va. 1981) (court recognized
a presumption in favor of the primary caretaker parent in child custody dis-
putes). See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
79. 429 U.S. 589, 599 n.25 (1977), citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)
and Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (Brandeis, J, dissenting).
80. 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
81. Id. at 457.
82. 601 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 995 (1979).
83. 232 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 1975).
84. Id at 548-49. See also Linda F.M. v. Department of Health, 52 N.Y.2d 236,
239, 437 N.Y.S. 2d 283, 284, 418 N.E.2d 1302, 1303 (1981) (natural parents retain a
potentially strong interest in maintaining their anonymity); In the Matter of the
Adoption of E.W.C., 89 Misc. 2d 64, 67-68, 389 N.Y.S. 2d 743, 746 (Fam. Ct. 1976)
(unwed mothers' threatened loss of privacy may lead to socially undesirable
routes to the placing of children); and Mills v. Atlantic City Dept. of Vital Sta-
tistics, 148 NJ. Super. 302, 311-14, 372 A.2d 646, 651 (1977) (statutes mandating
confidentiality of sealed adoption records are constitutional).
85. Unwed Mothers' Amicus Brief, supra note 20, at 34.
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through legal channels rather than pursue some other course,
legal or illegal, that she would not consider in her own best in-
terest or in the best interest of the child. Permitting a paternal
adoption veto will undoubtedly discourage women and make
them fearful of placing their children for adoption. Indeed the
inescapable lesson will be that unless a woman can success-
fully conceal the father's identity,86 she can only protect the
privacy and anonymity of her circumstances by choosing what
may be for her an undesirable option. She may decide to abort
even though she wishes to carry the fetus to term. She may at-
tempt black market adoption. Or she may keep the child even
when she knows that would not be in the best interest of the
child. When unprepared young girls keep their children the
state loses resources, both human and economic. The girls
often drop out of school, they diminish their job prospects, and
their children often require public assistance for basic needs.
The fourth compelling state interest served by the Texas
statutory scheme is the interest in preventing the exploitation
of women as unwilling breeders of babies for men who desire
children but have not found women who are able and willing to
bear children with or for them. At least one reported case
shows that this is a realistic concern. In W.E.J. v. Superior
Court of Los Angeles County,87 the unwed mother, Ms. G., re-
leased her baby for adoption. The biological father, Mr. L., ap-
peared at the adoption hearing.88 He testified that he was, at
86. C.K. writes: "[1f the father could veto adoption] I land others] would
lie like crazy ... [although the bad result would be that] these babies' biologi-
cal backgrounds would be hazy messes." Id. at 35.
87. 100 Cal. App. 3d 303, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1979). In a similar unreported
case in Cleveland, a married man sought visitation rights to his biological child
born to a woman married to another man (case settled out of court).
See also People ex rel Irby v. Dubois, 41 i1. App. 3d 609, 354 N.E. 2d 562
(1976) where the unwed father married another woman when the children
(twins) were nine months old, took them for a few hours of visitation three
days later, never returned them, and sought to have custody transferred to
himself and his new wife. Id. at 610, 354 N.E.2d at 564. The court granted him
custody on the ground that since he was married, the children would have a
"more stable environment and family life," and on the ground that he was em-
ployed, while the mother was on welfare, so that he could provide the children
with more "material advantages." Id at 614-15, 354 N.E.2d at 567. The Irby case
is not a clear case of a man exploiting a woman to get a child for his childless
marriage because there is no evidence of premeditation on his part and also no
evidence as to whether his new wife could have had children. Nonetheless, it is
a clear case of exploitation in the sense that the woman who bore the children
for nine months and raised them for another nine months lost them to a father
who had never demonstrated any responsibility toward them or their mother
until he took them from her by deception.
88. W.E.J., 314 U.S. at 306, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
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the time of the conception and at the time of the hearing, mar-
ried to a woman other than Ms. G.,89 and that his wife was un-
able to bear children.90 He also testified that at the time the
child was conceived, Ms. G. agreed that Mr. and Mrs. L would
raise the child and that Mr. L. would support Ms. G. during the
pregnancy and postpartum period.91 He testified that he lived
up to his part of the bargain, but she did not. The trial court
granted him custody on a mistaken view that California law9 2
required it because he was without question the biological
parent.93
The appeals court held the alleged agreement immaterial,
stating that an agreement between parents respecting custody
does not limit the power of the court.94 Because Mr. L. was not
a "presumed father" under California law, the court further
held he was not entitled to veto the adoption and not entitled to
custody,95 although the court on remand would have to con-
sider whether custody to him would be in the best interests of
the child.96
In the course of its opinion, the W.E.J. court quoted the
warning of a noted legal scholar.
The extreme view that all unmarried fathers are to be ac-
corded equal custody rights with the mother (and on a par
with married fathers) would have disastrous consequences
for the child. Every unmarried father would then have the
power to block an adoption by withholding consent, and
would be in a position to remove the child from the mother.
It is one thing to recognize the father's custodial rights
when father and mother are living together as a de facto
family, or when the children live with the father. California
law accords the father custody rights under such circum-
stances. It is quite another matter to extend equality of
custody to the father who is a stranger to the child.97
The scholar's concerns about "disastrous consequences for the
child" are well-founded. There could also be disastrous conse-
quences for the mother. In the W.E.J. case the biological father
claimed there had been an agreement between him and the
89. Id.
90. Id. at 330 (dissent), 160 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
91. Id. at 306 n.2, 330, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 864 n.2, 879.
92. Cal. Civ. Code § 7004 (West 1983).
93. W.E.. at 308-11, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 865-67.
94. Id. at 306 n.2, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 864 n.2.
95. Id. at 305, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
96. Id. at 311, 315, 160 CaL Rptr. at 867, 870.
97. Brigitte Bodenheimer, New D-ends and Requirements in Adoption Law
and Proposalsfor Legislative Change, 49 S. Cal. L Rev. 10, 57-58 (1975), quoted
in W.E.J., 314 U.S. at 310, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
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mother, but the actual facts underlying WE.J. could just as eas-
ily be either of the following. First, knowing of his wife's inabil-
ity to have children, Mr. L could have had a sexual relationship
with Ms. G. for the purpose, unknown to her, of eventually
gaining a child. This would give Mr. L. the benefits of a surro-
gate mother with little expense. Second, desiring to have an
extramarital affair with Ms. G., Mr. L. could have accidentally
contributed to the pregnancy. When the pregnancy became
known, he could have decided to take advantage of the situa-
tion to gain custody of the child for his childless marriage.
In each of these two scenarios the unwed mother suffers
the same amount of oppression. In each case the mother suf-
fers severe detriment from the pregnancy and childbirth while
each father reaps the benefit of a newborn child for his child-
less home. Additionally, if the baby was born with any defects,
the father could simply make no claim to it and burden the
mother with planning the child's future.
In Roe v. Wade,98 the Court enumerated the detriments
that may flow from childbearing, including physical and mental
health damages.99 Those detriments still remain. In an age of
advanced medical technology, we tend to block out the fact
that, for women, pregnancy and childbirth are still physically
hazardous and sometimes fatal. 00 The mortality rate during
birth for women of Ms. S.'s age is many times greater than the
mortality rate for women having a first trimester abortion.101 A
woman of Ms. S.'s age who foregoes her right to abort drasti-
cally increases her risk of death. Serious complications of preg-
nancy are also far more common than one would hope.102 In
addition, there are what physicians sometimes call the "minor"
complaints of pregnancy, 03 which are not minor to persons un-
dergoing them.
For a woman whose religious or moral beliefs preclude
abortion, and for women who do not realize they are pregnant
or who deny it until the pregnancy is quite advanced, preg-
98. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
99. Id. at 153.
100. For example, the plaintiff in an important Supreme Court sex discrimi-
nation case was a father whose wife died in childbirth. Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld, 420 U.S. 636, 639 (1975).
101. Scott Lebolt, David Grimes & Willard Cates, Mortality from Abortion
and Childbirtk Are the Populations Comparable? 248 J. A.M.A. 188, 189-91
(1982).
102. See, e.g., Jack Pritchard & Paul MacDonald, Williams Obstetrics 487-549,
665-704, 893-922 (16th ed. 1980).
103. Id. at 322-26.
1984]
Law and Inequality
nancy and childbirth are physically dangerous and emotionally
wrenching experiences. Adding the stress and pain of knowing
that the biological father has a right to the child even when the
mother and a court would both agree that the child's best inter-
ests lie elsewhere would put an unconscionable burden on the
pregnant woman. As E.M. states: "I am the person who is car-
rying this child. Not he. I am the person whose mental and
physical health take risks. Not his. (sicl"10 4
Serious physical and psychological stresses that accom-
pany the pregnancy and childbirth resulting from an accidental
and unwanted conception would become even more oppressive
if also caused by the premeditated plans of a man bent on us-
ing the woman--or girl-as a surrogate mother without her con-
sent. The courts should not countenance a rule giving a
biological father the right to veto an adoption of a child that
would be in the child's best interest. Such a right could be
used for, and probably would encourage, the oppression of wo-
men, especially young, naive, and inexperienced women such
as Ms. S.
C. There are no Less Intrusive Alternatives to the
Current Texas Statutory Scheme; In Fact, Texas
Gives Unwed Fathers Far More Rights
than the Constitution Requires
Even assuming that Mr. Kirkpatrick has a substantive due
process interest in a child who is connected to him by biology
alone, this interest may be overcome by a showing that a stat-
ute impinging on that right is necessary to the achievement of
the compelling state interests above. A statute is "necessary"
to achievement of a compelling state interest if no less intru-
sive means are available.s05 Here, no less intrusive alternative
to the Texas statutory scheme is available to cover cases such
as the one at bar.106 Mr. Kirkpatrick suggested none.
Mr. Kirkpatrick urges a requirement that the biological fa-
ther be proven unfit before disallowing legitimation. 0 7 An un-
104. Unwed Mothers' Anxicus Brief, supra note 20, at 42.
105. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388-90 (1978).
106. The Texas law may have constitutional defects as to fathers such as Pe-
ter Stanley, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646 (1972), and Abdiel Caban,
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382 (1979) with whom the mothers of the
children at issue had entered into family relationships, but Mr. Kirkpatrick is
not similarly situated to them and so may not complain of this. See Broaderick
v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973).
107. Brief for Petitioner at 34-38, Kirkpatrick
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fitness standard would not achieve the state's compelling state
interests. It would not serve the state's interest in protecting
freedom of choice because a hearing on unfitness could not be
conducted within the time constraints for a safe abortion. An
unfitness standard would also not serve the state's interest in
preventing the exploitation of women as unwilling breeders of
babies for men. In most cases, such a hidden motive for caus-
ing pregnancy would be impossible to prove.
In fact, the Texas law gives the unwed father more rights
than he is constitutionally entitled to receive. Texas could bar
an unwed potential father from asserting any custodial rights
unless he filed a notice of intent to legitimate the child within,
for example, ten days from the time when he knew or should
have known of a possible pregnancy. The state has the consti-
tutional authority to require this even if the pregnant woman
never informs him of the pregnancy.
The state could constitutionally pass such a law for the
following reasons. It is more than reasonable to assume that
unwed men have sexual relationships for recreation, not pro-
creation. Those men who do not intend to procreate should not
receive any parental rights. An unwed man who has sex for
procreation can be assumed to know the name and address of
the woman he is attempting to procreate with and the dates on
which they had sexual relations. If he is sincere about wanting
to procreate, he can simply file a notice of intent to legitimate
the child within ten days of every sexual act. If he does not, it
is no one's fault but his own if he is given no rights to the child
who may result from his sexual acts.
No state currently has the hypothetical law just de-
scribed,108 but if a state did enact such a law, the Supreme
108. There are state laws with some similarities, however. The New York
statute (N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 111-a(2)(c) (McKinney 1977)) considered by the
Supreme Court in Lehr v. Robertson, 103 S. Ct. 2985 (1983), requiring a poten-
tial father to sign a "putative fathers' registry," is more generous to the unwed
father than the hypothetical statute. The New York statute was upheld.
Although the Lehr case involved the question of notice of an adoption pro-
ceeding and not the question of what standard had to be applied to a father
who had been given notice, many of the Court's comments in the Lehr case are
significant for the issues in a Kirkpatrick-type case. Some of the Court's com-
ments could be used in favor of Mr. Kirpatrick and some could be used against
him. For example, in denying Mr. Lehr's equal protection claim, the Court
stated that Jonathan Lehr and Lorraine Robertson, parents of Jessica, were not
similarly situated.
Whereas [Lorraine] had a continuous custodial responsibility for
Jessica, (Jonathani never established any custodial, personal, or fi-
nancial relationship with her. If one parent has an established cus-
todial relationship with the child and the other parent has either
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Court could uphold it. Such a statute would not violate the un-
abandoned or never established a relationship, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause does not prevent a state from according the two par-
ents different legal rights.
Lehr, 103 S. Ct. at 2996-97.
Kirkpatrick could claim that he did demonstrate a full commitment to the
responsibilities of parenthood by "coming forward to participate in the rearing
of his child." Id. at 2993, citing Caban, 441 U.S. at 392. He could say that he did
grasp the opportunity to develop a relationship with his offspring and accept
some measure of responsibility for the child's future. Lehr, 103 S. Ct. at 2993.
He could claim that he established the only kind of relationship that he could
establish with Baby Girl S., which was a financial relationship. He could claim
that he attempted to establish a custodial and personal relationship with the
child.
Against Kirkpatrick, Ms. S. could claim that some of the language in the
Lehr case would support the Texas statute that permits a child to be adopted
over the objection of the putative father when a court and the mother deem it
to be in the child's best interest. For example, the mother could quote footnote
16 of the Lehr case in which the Court, quoting from Justice Stewart's dissent
in Caban, 441 U.S. at 397, stated:
[Hlere we are concerned with the rights the unwed father may
have when his wishes and those of the mother are in conflict, and
the child's best interests are served by a resolution in favor of the
mother. It seems to me that the absence of a legal tie with the
mother may in such circumstances appropriately place a limit on
whatever substantive constitutional claims might otherwise exist
by virtue of the father's actual relationship with the children.
Lehr, 203 S. Ct. at 2993 n.16.
Ms. S. could also point out that, factually, Mr. Lehr had much more of a re-
lationship with his child than Mr. Kirkpatrick had with his child. Mr. Lehr had
visited with the child in the hospital, had sought to track down the mother and
child, and had visited with the child on several occasions. Id. at 2997 (White, J.,
dissenting). However, the Supreme Court said Lehr never had a "significant
custodial, personal, or financial relationship" with the child. Id. at 2994. If
Lehr's relationship with his child was not significant, Kirkpatrick's relationship
with his child was even less so.
The Lehr case indicates that if the state statute is written properly, and an
adoption proceeding is commenced before a legitimation or paternity proceed-
ing, the adoption court may proceed without acknowledging that the legitima-
tion or paternity proceeding is taking place. In a sense, this makes it a race to
the courthouse and it seems improper to make substantive rights dependent
upon such a race, but in a case where a young child's interests are involved,
children cannot wait for years and years until adults finally make up their
minds what to do.
The Court stated in Lehr:
If this scheme [putative father registry) were likely to omit many
responsible fathers, and if qualification for notice were beyond the
control of an interested putative father, it might be thought proce-
durally inadequate. Yet, as all of the New York courts that re-
viewed this matter observed, the right to receive notice was
completely within appellant's control By mailing a postcard to the
putative father registry, he could have guaranteed that he would
receive notice of any proceedings to adopt Jessica.
Id. at 2994-95. This implies that a Michigan-type statute might even be held
constitutional, so that unwed fathers' rights could be resolved at an earlier
stage. See infra note 121.
The Court states in Lehr that the substantive due process liberty interest
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wed potential father's substantive due process rights because
the state has a compelling state interest in protecting a wo-
man's right to choose to abort or bear the child. To protect this
right the woman must know of any potential claims to the child
before the time to abort safely passes.
This hypothetical law also would not violate the potential
father's procedural due process rights. In essence, it is a notice
of claim requirement 0 9 with a short statute of limitations.
Since he knows that a child might result from any act of inter-
course, and since a short statute of limitations is necessary to
achieve the state's compelling state interests, it would not vio-
late his procedural due process rights. The law does not re-
quire the pregnant woman to notify him of the pregnancy
because the sexual act that created the pregnancy notifies him.
The Texas law gives an unwed father-to-be greater rights
than our hypothetical statute. Texas law provides no means by
which the pregnant woman can unilaterally cut off all of his
rights to notice and a hearing on the best interests of the child
before the birth of the child. The Texas law requires no notice
of claim by him within a short period of time after intercourse
or, indeed, at any time before receipt of notice that the mother
intends to place the child for adoption. Like the statute upheld
in Quilloin,11O which also contains a "best interests" standard,
the Texas statute permits a legitimation action long after the
child's birth. Finally, the Texas law affords an unwed father a
best interests hearing after the birth under all circumstances,
even though he has no constitutional right to a hearing of any
sort unless he requested one early in the pregnancy. Because
the Texas law affords the unwed father far more than is consti-
tutionally required, it must be upheld.
(which the Court has termed a privacy interest) in raising one's child is not
created by a mere biological link. Id. at 2993. Kirkpatrick's argument was that
the biological link between himself and Baby Girl S. gave him the right to veto
the adoption and to have custody of her unless the court terminated his paren-
tal rights for unfitness. Following Lehr's implications, the Court would reject
this argument.
See also In Re N., 10 FAM. L REP. 1219 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) in which a court
upheld as constitutional, relying on Lehr, a statute that dispenses with the re-
quirement of notice of adoption to the putative father unless he (1) establishes
his paternity, (2) commences a filiation proceeding, (3) lives with the child
some time during the 60 days prior to initiation of adoption proceedings, or
(4) supports or attempts to support the child during the year prior to initiation
of adoption proceedings.
109. Cf., N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50-e (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1983-84) (notice
of claim must be served on defendant within 90 days of tort).




Mr. Kirkpatrick has argued that the Texas statutory
scheme incorporates an impermissible gender bias. This argu-
ment has no merit. The proponent of a facially sex-based stat-
ute must bear the burden delineated in Craig v. Boren of
demonstrating that the statute is substantially related to an im-
portant governmental objective.l1 l Here the state of Texas has
met that burden. As we have demonstrated above, the Texas
statutory scheme is necessary to the achievement of compel-
ling state interests. If it passes the higher "strict scrutiny" test,
it automatically passes the Craig intermediate level of scrutiny.
The Texas statutory scheme contains no sexual stereo-
types that portray men as incapable of good parenting. There
is no conclusive evidence that men are inherently less capable
than women of raising children.112 Petitioner does not need
myriad citations 13 to prove that point. Texas nowhere denies
it.
Factually, this is an anomalous case in which to make
such a claim. When asked about care for the child, Mr. Kirk-
patrick always referred to his mother, who would have to quit
her job to do so,114 his sister,"15 or his grandmother.116 It appar-
ently never occurred to him that he-not the women in his fam-
ily-would be ultimately responsible for the child's care. It
apparently never occurred to him that perhaps a time might
come when all of the women in his family might be engaged in
other pursuits and he might have to hire a babysitter or quit
his own job to take care of the child. His sole testimony on the
issue of his own care of the child was as follows:
Q. Will you take care of the child at night?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you understand that taking care of a child is a lot of
work?
A. Yes, I do.117
Such perfunctory answers, together with the rest of his testi-
111. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). The Craig test has been fol-
lowed (at least nominally) in all later Supreme Court equal protection sex dis-
crimination cases, including Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718 (1982), and Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981).
112. With the exception of breastfeeding. But see studies cited in Klaff,
supra note 5.
113. Brief for Petitioner at 71 n.1, Kirkpatrick.
114. Joint Appendix at 202a; 213a; 264a, Kirkpatrick.
115. Id. at 202a.
116. 1d at 209a-210a.
117. 1d. at 202a-203a.
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mony, hardly indicate that he put much thought into the ques-
tion of his care of the child. His mother never testified that, on
his own, Mr. Kirkpatrick would be capable of caring for the
child.1n8
It is not argued that just because an unwed father's child-
care plans include relatives, the plans are inadequate. It is ad-
mirable and healthy for relatives to assist each other. On the
record in this case, however, a judge would be compelled to
conclude that Mr. Kirkpatrick was planning to take virtually no
personal responsibility for the care of his child, and that an
award of custody to him would really be an award of custody to
his mother or sister, who has no legally enforceable right to
such custody.
Via the petitioner's brief,119 we are now informed that Mr.
Kirkpatrick has married, and that his wife is expecting a child
in July, 1983. "Mrs. Kirkpatrick is a full-time homemaker and
joins in her husband's desire to raise the daughter."120 Yet an-
other woman appears to take over the childcare responsibili-
ties! Petitioner seems to be arguing that awarding custody to
fathers will contribute to the breakdown of sex-role stereotyp-
ing. That will be true only if the father truly performs the pri-
mary nurturing function. If his mother, sister, grandmother, or
new wife performs that function, traditional sex roles will re-
main intact.
III. The "Best Interests of the Child" Test
The "best interests of the child" test is not perfect. It is
not a mathematical formula that can be applied to reach a sure
result. But it functions. All over the country judges use it daily
to determine custody matters between divorcing parents.
Many states, like Texas, use it in a context such as this.121 For
118. Id. at 253a.
119. Brief for Petitioner at 17, n.1, Kirkpatrick.
120. Id. There are obvious similarities between the Kirkpatrick case and
Irby, discussed supra in note 87.
121. Petitioner states in his appendix that "forty-one jurisdictions apply the
same standard as they do to other parents, where the unwed father demon-
strates the degree of interest and support petitioner Kirkpatrick has in this
case." Brief for Petitioner at 7, Kirkpatrick. This implies that Mr. Kirkpatrick
would win legitimation of Baby Girl S. in those 41 jurisdictions, except in the
six of those using a best interests standard for both parents, leaving 35 jurisdic-
tions. But petitioner is wrong as to some of those 35 and in others the precise
standard is unclear. For example, petitioner is wrong about Alaska. See Alaska
Stat. § 25.23.180(c)(2) (1983). The situation in California is unclear, but most
likely Mr. Kirkpatrick would not be able to legitimate Baby Girl S. there under
these circumstances. See W.EJ. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 101
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the reasons explained above, an unfitness standard would not
serve the compelling state interests involved here.
Finally, it should be noted that this is not a case in which
the possibility of adoption is at all doubtful and in which failure
to legitimate the child would result in the child's being placed
in foster care. It is true, as Mr. Kirkpatrick alleges, that the
trial judge did not have before him the specific adoptive par-
ents, in order to put them on the stand. This would destroy the
anonymity of the adoption process. But the judge had testi-
mony from the unwed mother both that she did not think Mr.
Kirkpatrick would be as good a parent as she herself and also
that her wishes were to place the child for adoption.122 As the
child's genetic parent, the person who went through the preg-
nancy and childbirth, and the child's guardian, the mother has
a substantive due process right to have her wishes considered.
Additionally, the Christian Homes of Abilene, Inc., is a licensed
child-placement agency, held by the state of Texas to high stan-
dards of investigation of prospective adoptive parents.
Conclusion
Listen carefully to the voices of the young unwed mothers
whose interests have not yet been represented.
P.K. writes:
Please before a decision is made put yourself in our place.
Also, if you have [a] daughter or younger sister what place
would this put her in? Thank you and think hard about this
before deciding.
On a more philosophical level, S.S. writes:
We are a very strange society. In our very efforts to pro-
mote "freedom" and "openness" and "equality" we may
find ourselves harming the very structures and institutions,
in this case family and adoption, which we seek to protect
and strengthen.123
Cal. App. 3d 303, 160 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1979). The situation in Michigan is also un-
clear because Ms. S. would have had the right to cut off his rights by serving
him with a notice before the birth. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 710.34 (West
Supp. 1983-84). The recently enacted (eff. June 29, 1982) Ohio law is also un-
clear. Compare Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2105.18 (Page Supp. 1982) (best inter-
ests test) with § 3111.01 et seq. (best interests test implied but not stated).
122. Joint Appendix at 186a, Kirkpatrick.
123. Unwed Mothers' Amicus Brief, supra note 20, at 61.
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